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Health Care Law: A Field of Gaps
David Orentlicher,MD., J.D.*
During the past twenty-five years, a number of
issues in health care law have illustrated an
important paradox. As Tocqueville observed more
than one hundred fifty years ago in his classic study
of the United States, we regularly turn to the courts
to resolve our political differences.1 Yet, many
issues that seem to have been settled by the courts
turn out not to be very settled. The continuing
debates over abortion provide a prominent
illustration. Decisions at the end of life offer
important examples as well. Although courts have concluded that
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is the same as withholding such
treatment and that withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration is no
different than withdrawing artificial ventilation, many people continue to
hew to those distinctions.
Because critical issues may be judicially decided but publicly unsettled,
health care law is very much a field of gaps-gaps between law on the
books and law in practice, gaps between perceptions of law and its actual
impact, and gaps between rhetoric and reality.2 Perhaps these gaps are not
surprising. Health care law deals with many difficult and controversial
issues, issues that really can mean the difference between life and death.
Still we can hope that over the next twenty-five years, these gaps might be
narrowed if not bridged.
I. GAPS BETWEEN LAW ON THE BOOKS AND LAW IN PRACTICE
End-of-life decision making provides a number of examples where
doctors and sometimes even judges deviate from the legal principles that
seemingly have been well-established.

* Samuel R. Rosen Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Law and Health, Indiana
University School of Law-Indianapolis. M.D., Harvard Medical School; J.D., Harvard Law
School. I am grateful for the comments of Judy Failer.
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA, Chapter 16 (1835).

2. Of course, there is also the gap between the ideal laws and the laws that are enacted,
but that gap is an inherent part of the political process.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2010

1

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 19 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 3

2

Annals of Health Law - 25th Anniversary Special Edition [Vol. 19

Following ethical understanding, for example, the law has rejected a3
distinction between withdrawing and withholding life-sustaining treatment.
In one view, doctors have a greater obligation to maintain treatment than to
initiate it, just as a bystander has a greater obligation to complete the rescue
of a person in distress than to begin a rescue. This view, however, has not
gained acceptance-it is clear under the law that the right to have medical
treatment withdrawn is the same as the right to have treatment withheld.
Nevertheless, health care providers continue to feel that it is less acceptable
to withdraw care than to withhold it. The physician who discontinues
artificial ventilation can easily feel more responsible for a patient's death
than when ventilation is never begun.
Or consider the prevailing principle that a person's right to refuse
medical treatment does not depend on the person's medical condition or the
nature of the treatment being refused. The young, generally healthy adult
can refuse a life-saving antibiotic just as a very old adult with widely
metastatic lung cancer can refuse artificial ventilation. As courts have
observed, patients and their families will want to take into account the
patient's condition and the kind of medical treatment at stake in deciding
whether to accept or refuse care, but the patient's right is not limited
because of the patient's favorable prognosis or the minimal intrusion of
treatment. 4 Yet, doctors and judges may respond differently when faced
with a young person's refusal of a blood transfusion. In Florida, for
example, the state supreme court had to overturn a lower court's decision to
it had
order the transfusion of blood for a young mother even though
5
overturned a lower court in a comparable case four years earlier.
Similarly, even though courts have invoked common law and
constitutional law principles to recognize the same right to refuse artificial
nutrition and hydration as to refuse artificial ventilation or dialysis, some
living will statutes make it more difficult for people to exercise their right to
refuse unwanted nutrition and hydration. In addition, studies have found
that physicians are quicker to recommend the discontinuation of ventilators,
dialysis, and other treatments than the discontinuation of nutrition and
hydration.6 Families are no different. Even after winning the right to have
his daughter Karen's ventilator withdrawn, Joseph Quinlan did not agree to
have her feeding tube withdrawn. When asked if 7he wanted to stop her
feeding, he replied, "Oh no, that is her nourishment."
3. MARK HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW AND
ETHICS 532-33 (7th ed., Aspen Publishers 2007).
4. Id. at 535-37.
5. Id. at 544-45.
6. Id at 533-34, 584.
7. Paul Ramsey, Prolonged Dying: Not Medically Indicated, 6(1) HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 14, 16 (1976).
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II. GAPS BETWEEN PERCEPTIONS OF LAW AND ITS ACTUAL IMPACT

Doctors frequently view the law as hostile to them, while in fact, courts
(and legislatures) treat physicians quite favorably, with a high degree of
deference to professional judgment. Thus, for example, physicians see the
law as ever-ready to punish them when patients suffer bad outcomes, even
when no malpractice occurred. However, juries are more likely to decide in
favor of physicians than other personal injury defendants, judges allow
physicians to determine their own standard of care, and only a small
percentage of patients harmed by negligence ever sue.8
The law's deference to professional judgment is common throughout the
law. When the Supreme Court decided that the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) protects persons with communicable diseases from
discrimination in the workplace and other settings, it also recognized that
the ADA does not prevent employers and other people from taking
reasonable steps to protect themselves from infection. The Court observed
further that trial courts should defer to professional medical judgment in
deciding whether a person's communicable disease poses a significant risk
to the health and safety of other people. 9
Or consider the question whether doctors may withhold life-sustaining
treatment even when it is desired by the patient (or the patient's family), on
the ground that the treatment would be medically futile. Although courts
are reluctant to grant a hospital's request to withdraw or withhold lifesustaining treatment because of futility, they regularly validate futility
decisions by hospitals that have already been implemented when the family
later sues for wrongful death. As one court observed, whether treatment is
futile is a question of the standard of care to be determined by professional
10
consensus.
III. GAPS BETWEEN RHETORIC AND REALITY
Life-and-death decisions are challenging enough but especially so in a
world of limited resources. When the organ transplantation system decides
on the recipient of a heart or liver, when physicians decide how to allocate
their time among different patients, or when insurers decide whether a novel
treatment should be covered, it is difficult to explain to those who are
disfavored in the process why that should be the case. And it is difficult for
decision makers to acknowledge their responsibility for the outcomes.
Accordingly, health care providers frequently camouflage rationing

8. HALL ET AL., supra note 3, at 274-75, 287-91.
9. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 650 (1998); Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273,288 (1987).
10. Causey v. St. FrancisMed Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1076 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
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decisions as medical decisions,11 and lawmakers support them when they do
so.

Thus, for example, rather than say that dialyzing a terminally ill patient is
a poor use of money and staff time, a physician might say that it is
medically futile to do so. By couching the decision in medical terms, a
physician delivers a message that is less susceptible to challenge by the
patient or family. Moreover, medical decisions are beyond the control of
the physician. 12 If treatment is withheld for "medical" reasons, it is not the
physician's fault that treatment will not be provided; it is the failure of
medical science. And as indicated above, courts will support doctors and
hospitals after they have withdrawn or withheld care on grounds of futility.
Consider, as well, society's adoption of "brain death." Leading, early
proponents of brain criteria for death cited the burdens "on those in need of
hospital beds already occupied by these comatose patients" as one
important reason for implementing the proposal.1 3 But rather than simply
say that resources are better used for patients who might recover than for
patients who have irreversibly lost all brain function, society redefined the
most severely brain-damaged patients as dead. Thus, these patients are
denied medical care on the ground that they are medically unsuited for care
rather than because they are less-deserving candidates for care.
To be sure, such subterfuges are not entirely successful. The use of
medical futility to justify denials of care often provoke controversy, and the
public still does not view "brain death" the same as death determined by the
cessation of the heartbeat. When pregnant women are ventilated after the
declaration of death by brain criteria until their fetuses are viable and can be
delivered, it is common to see them described as dying on the day that the
ventilator is finally removed. 14 Nevertheless, the subterfuges persist or are
replaced by new subterfuges, for the acknowledgement of the reality would
be too unsettling.
IV. CONCLUSION

It is often said that the law lags behind developments in medicine. As I
have suggested, developments in the law often outpace public sentiments
and preferences. An important task for the next twenty-five years will be to
understand better the nature of the gaps between health care law and the
public's views and to figure out how to bridge those gaps. I expect the

11.
12.

GuIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 18, 64-66 (1978).
DAVID ORENTLICHER, MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH 160-61 (2001).

13. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the
Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of IrreversibleComa, 205 JAMA 85, 85 (1968).
14. Richard Willing, Brain-DeadWoman Dies After Baby Born, USA TODAY, Aug. 4,
2005, at 3A.
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Beazley Institute for Health Law and Policy to play a key role in this
endeavor, as it has in health care law for the past twenty-five years.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2010

5

